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Sex Selection, Nondirectiveness, and
Equality
SONIA M.

SUTERt

In exploring the implications of genetics technology for women, Mary
Mahowald's article briefly discusses the ethos of nondirectiveness in genetic
counseling and its relationship to feminism. This relationship is of particular
concern to the largely female group of master's-degree genetic counselors, or
genetic associates as they are sometimes called,' because genetic counselors
must grapple with the sometimes morally problematic implications of genetic
technology. Sex selection, in particular, creates a very real tension for many
genetic counselors who are committed to equality and feminist goals. On the
one hand, this commitment to equality motivates a nondirective approach in
which counselors are expected to support and accept the choices of their
clients. On the other hand, equality seems to clash directly with the selection
of fetuses on the basis of sex. In order to better understand the difficulty of
maintaining an approach to genetic counseling that is both nondirective and
feminist, I will explore nondirectiveness and its application to sex selection in
light of the principle of equality.2
Post-implantation sex selection' uses prenatal testing to determine the sex
of the fetus and selective abortion to terminate the pregnancy if the fetus is

© 1996 Sonia M. Suter. All rights reserved.
tSonia M. Suter is a Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School.
She was a genetic counselor at Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit, Michigan, from 1989 to
1991.
1. The term "genetic counselor" can refer to anyone who provides genetic counseling,
whether she holds an M.D., Ph.D., or M.S. degree. "Genetic associate" generally refers
only to master's-degree genetic counselors. I shall use the terms interchangeably unless I
specifically indicate that I mean to refer solely to the master's-level genetic counselors.
2. I do not intend to define or explore the meaning of equality in any detail. Rather,
I use the term to refer to the notion that individuals should be treated justly and with
respect. Any discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, or sexuality, for
example, is a violation of equality.
3. In this Article, sex selection refers to post-implantation sex selection unless otherwise stated. Pre-implantation sex selection may become routine in the future, but it
currently remains experimental. Nora Frenkiel, 'Family Planning': Baby Boy or Girl?, NY
Times C1, C6 (Nov 11, 1993). The pre-implantation technique raises some unique ethical
concerns that are beyond the scope of this Article.
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not of the desired sex. While sex selection has been possible for over two
decades, it remains the most vivid illustration of the dilemmas that

nondirectiveness can pose for genetic counselors when couples decide to select
children on the basis of non-medical traits, as opposed to genetic disease. It
also starkly highlights the equality concerns raised by the serious denigration
of women in many cultures where sex selection is used disproportionately to
select male fetuses over female fetuses.4
Sex selection is one of the most difficult moral dilemmas that genetic
counselors face, given their moral and feminist aversions to such a use of
prenatal testing and their nondirective ethos.' Many genetic counselors condemn sex selection because it denies equality between the sexes. Yet, they are
committed to the ethos of nondirectiveness out of a similar concern for
equality and justice, as nondirective counseling seeks to protect equality by
giving voice to individual perspectives and values and by empowering the
disenfranchised. While most master's-level genetic counselors ultimately accept
the use of sex selection based on their commitment to protecting client
autonomy,6 the procedure nevertheless results in "cognitive dissonance" for
genetic counselors who struggle with these conflicting moral principles.7
Is the dilemma posed by this commitment to equality resolvable or must
genetic counselors choose between nondirectiveness and a rejection of sex
selection? In other words, if they care about equality, must genetic counselors
remain nondirective to the extent that they grant requests for sex selection
without expressing their disapproval? Or should they reject nondirectiveness,
at least with regard to sex selection, in the interest of promoting equality? Or
is there a third alternative--can the problem be refrained such that the
dilemma is dissolved?
In order to attempt to resolve or address this conflict, we must first expose
the conceptual underpinnings of the moral conflict raised by certain uses of
genetic technology such as sex selection. Therefore, in this Article, I will
examine the ways in which a concern for equality and justice can support two
seemingly contradictory positions: a commitment to nondirectiveness and an
aversion to many forms of sex selection! I will begin, in Part I, by presenting
4. See Alison Dundes Renteln, Sex Selection and Reproductive Freedom, 15 Women's
Studies Intl Forum 405, 409-11 (1992).
5. Dorothy C. Wertz, John C. Fletcher, and John L. Mulvihill, Medical Geneticists

Confront Ethical Dilemmas: Cross-Cultural Comparisons Among 18 Nations, 46 Am J
Hum Genetics 1200, 1212 (1990).

6. Deborah F. Pencarinha, et al, Ethical Issues in Genetic Counseling: A Comparison
of M.S. Counselor and Medical Geneticist Perspectives, 1 J Genetic Counseling 19, 24
(1992) (finding 82% of master's-level counselors versus 62% of M.D. or Ph.D. genetic
counselors would perform (38.3% versus 34%) or refer (43.4% versus 28%) patients to
other centers for sex selection). While these data come from two surveys conducted four
years apart, the data are highly suggestive of occupational differences, even if occupations

may not account for the full difference in approaches.
7. B. Meredith Burke, Genetic Counselor Attitudes Towards Fetal Sex Identification
and Selective Abortion, 34 Soc Sci Med 1263, 1268 (1992).
8. I want to qualify up front that not every instance of sex selection is morally
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the equality-based arguments for rejecting the practice of sex selection, particularly when used in the context of cultural attitudes that devalue women.9 Part
II will discuss nondirectiveness as articulated in the literature, arguing that
among the principles underlying nondirectiveness is a concern for equality.
Finally, Part I outlines possible ways of resolving this conflict.
I. Equality Concerns Raised by Sex Selection
Of all of the reasons prenatal testing is requested, sex selection is one of
the least common in the United States. In this country, requests for the
procedure typically come from families of foreign origin, for example, families
from Asia, India, or Islamic cultures." These requests often reflect certain
cultural ideals, which, in many instances, devalue women. Despite the fact
that sex selection is not prevalent in this country, the practice raises important
concerns. Genetic counselors find sex selection especially morally problematic
because it is the tip of the non-medical trait-selection iceberg; that is, sex
selection uses genetic technology, not to prevent disease in future children, but
to select children on the basis of non-medical traits. Genetic counselors also
share the view of many feminists that any use of sex selection in the context
of devaluing females is reprehensible.
In fact, the consensus among most ethicists is that, in most instances, sex
selection is immoral, largely because it violates principles of equality and
justice." The primary concerns are that the procedure promotes sexism or is
itself inherently sexist. 2 Even if some of the reasons for sex selection may not

problematic to genetic counselors. In this Article, I am focusing on sex selection practices
that counselors or others believe reveal discriminatory attitudes towards women.
9. The consensus among ethicists and geneticists holds that sex selection is generally
morally offensive. See Ruth Schwartz Cowan, Genetic Technology and Reproductive
Cboice: An Ethics for Autonomy, in Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy Hood, eds, The Code of
Codes: Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project 244, 253 (Harvard
1992).
10. Burke, 34 Soc Sci Med at 1265 (cited in note 7). John Fletcher estimated that
between 1970 and 1983, at 125 prenatal diagnostic centers, doctors performed no more
than 50 amniocentesis tests for sex selection. John C. Fletcher, Ethics and Public Policy:
Should Sex Choice Be Discouraged?, in Neil G. Bennett, ed, Sex Selection of Children 226
(Academic 1983). However, there is no good empirical data indicating the prevalence of
sex selection. Renteln, 15 Women's Studies Intl Forum at 413 (cited in note 4).
11. See Cowan, Ethics for Autonomy at 253 (cited in note 9) (paraphrasing 1979
Hastings Center Report condemning the procedure); Mark I. Evans, et al, Attitudes on the
ethics of abortion, sex selection, and selective pregnancy termination among bealtb care
professionals, etbicists, and clergy likely to encounter such situations, 164 Am J Obstet
Gynecol 1092, 1098 (1991); Dorothy C. Wertz, Reproductive Technologies: Sex Selection,
in Warren Thomas Reich, ed, 4 Encyclopedia of Bioetbics 2212, 2215 (Simon & Schuster

Macmillan rev ed 1995).
12. See, for example, Dorothy C. Wertz and John C. Fletcher, Sex Selection Through
PrenatalDiagnosis: A Feminist Critique, in Helen Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy,
eds, Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics 240, 242 (Indiana 1992) (citing Michael D.
Bayles, Reproductive Ethics 35 (Prentice-Hall 1984)); Mary Briody Mahowald, Women and
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appear actively sexist, such as the desire to balance a family by having, for
example, both a son and a daughter, many worry that, at best, the technique
promotes gender stereotyping.' 3 Such stereotyping, according to this view,
perpetuates the inequities between males and females. 4
Many commentators also fear that sex selection is the first step down the
slippery slope of attempting to design the perfect child. In other words, sex
selection, whether pre- or post-conceptual, may amount to a eugenic practice"5 or result in the commodification of offspring. 6 Such attitudes threaten
to create inequities between people on the basis of how closely they approximate notions of "perfection."
. Others are concerned that the use of sex selection may give credibility to
the pro-life movement's attempts to limit the availability of abortion. In other
words, if people use abortion to select against the birth of children with
undesirable non-medical traits, such as female sex, the anti-abortion position
will gain favor with the public. Ultimately, this could lead to the demise of the
protected right to abortion 7 or limitations on the uses of prenatal diagnosis.'" Since the ability to obtain abortions and prenatal testing is considered
central to the empowerment of women, any loss of reproductive rights threatens equality between the sexes.'9

Children in Health Care: An Unequal Majority 86 (Oxford 1993).
13. Wertz and Fletcher, Feminist Critique at 244 (cited in note 12) (citing Christine
Overall, Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Analysis 23-27 (Allen 1987));
Tabitha M. Powledge, Toward a Moral Policy for Sex Choice, in Neil G. Bennett, ed, Sex
Selection of Children 206 (Academic 1983); John Mahoney, The ethics of sex selection, in
Peter Byrne, ed, Medicine, Medical Ethics and the Value of Life 141, 151 (Wiley 1990);
Mahowald, Women and Children at 86 (cited in note 12).
14. The concern regarding gender stereotyping applies even in western cultures where
the preference for male children is not as great as in some Asian nations because many
Westerners still prefer that the first born child be male. Mary Anne Warren, Gendercide:
The Implications of Sex Selection 17-18 (Rowman & Allanheld 1985); Wertz and Fletcher,
Feminist Critique at 242 (cited in note 12); Gale Largey, Reproductive Technologies: Sex
Selection, in Warren T. Reich, ed, Encyclopedia of Blioethics 1439, 1443 (Free Press 1978).
The use of sex selection to control the gender sequence of offspring could also influence
stereotyping since traits identified with the first born often include those typically associated with males, such as ambition and confidence. Warren, Gendercide at 21. Thus, even
if families chose as many sons as daughters, the possibility that many families might
choose to select a male first-born child could influence gender roles. See Mahoney, The
ethics of sex selection at 150-51 (cited in note 13) (noting this concern among feminists);
Renteln, 15 Women's Studies Intl Forum at 416 (cited in note 4).
15. Fletcher, Ethics and Public Policy at 247 (cited in note 10); Wertz and Fletcher,
Feminist Critique at 245 (cited in note 12); Powledge, Moral Policy at 211 (cited in note
13); Mahoney, The ethics of sex selection at 155 (cited in note 13); Evans, et al, 164 Am
J Obstet Gynecol at 1098 (cited in note 11).
16. Mahoney, The ethics of sex selection at 146 (cited in note 13) (noting that even
pre-conceptual sex selection "treats the offspring as a 'product' to be tailored").
17. See Fletcher, Ethics and Public Policy at 229 (cited in note 10); Wertz and
Fletcher, Feminist Critique at 244 (cited in note 12).
18. See Wertz and Fletcher, Feminist Critique at 244 (cited in note 12).
19. Ruth Colker, Abortion and Dialogue: Pro Choice, Pro-Life and American Law 85
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Many ethicists also oppose sex selection on the grounds that it misallocates
scarce resources, particularly when only 25 percent of women in the United
States for whom prenatal diagnosis is medically indicated have access to such
services. 21 In a world in which access to health care is so grossly unequal,
such a misapplication of medical resources only exacerbates grave social
inequities. While the privileged may tailor children to their specifications, the
disadvantaged cannot even receive basic prenatal care.
Moreover, in many cultures, sex selection maintains men in positions of
wealth and power. If privileged families are best situated to take advantage of
sex selection, they are likely to have a greater percentage of sons than less
privileged families who must accept the natural ratio of sons and daughters.
Thus, there will be a larger proportion of males among the wealthy to inherit
the riches and positions of prestige and power.'
Perhaps the greatest concern regarding sex selection is its direct negative
impact on females. Many view sex selection as similar to infanticide, even if
it takes a less extreme form.' In fact, one commentator has coined the term
"gendercide" to emphasize the similarities between sex selection and genocidal
practices such as infanticide.24 Even critics who find sex selection preferable
to the ancient and too widely used practice of female infanticide in countries
such as China and India,' nevertheless charge that sex selection reflects the
same insidious attitudes toward women that underlie infanticide. Both practices
treat the sexes in horribly disparate ways, valuing males far in excess of
females, and both contribute to the continued inequality of women in those
cultures.
Furthermore, even though some critics suggest that sex selection could
improve the plight of women without sons, who, in some cultures, are frequently ill-treated, 6 they stress that the very need to protect these women
from shame or abuse for failing to bear a son reflects a dire manifestation of
inequality. Promoting sex selection, they claim, only causes sexist and unjust
attitudes towards women to become even more deeply ingrained and acceptable.' They also worry that the physiological and psychological risks of

(Indiana 1992).
20. Fletcher, Ethics and Public Policy at 226 (cited in note 10); Burke, 34 Soc Sci
Med at 1265 (cited in note 7); Largey, Sex Selection at 1439 (cited in note 14).
21. Dorothy C. Wertz and John C. Fletcher, Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex Selection in
19 Nations, 37 Soc Sci Med 1359, 1365 (1993).
22. Warren, Gendercide at 21 (cited in note 14).
23. Id.
24. Id at 22.
25. Dharma Kumar, Should One be Free to Choose the Sex of One's Child?, 2 J Applied Phil 197, 200 (1985).
26. Id; Wertz, Reproductive Technologies at 2214 (cited in note 11).
27. Renteln, 15 Women's Studies Intl Forum at 415 (cited in note 4).
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frequent abortions2" for women who want to ensure the birth of a male child
further perpetuate women's subordinate status."'
Sex selection may also result in a lower percentage of women in the
population, as in China where the ratio of live male births to female births has
increased.30 Critics fear that as women (and wombs) grow scarce, women will
be further devalued and commodified. Women might be prostituted to meet
the increased demand for female sexual companionship. Worse yet, they might
also become "baby machines" as "wife-less" men require these scarce "resources" to undergo numerous births to satisfy their desire for children.
In sum, critics of sex selection charge that it bolsters existing inappropriate
or immoral inequalities and perpetuates perniciously discriminatory attitudes.
In their view, sex selection is antithetical to a deep commitment to protecting
equality both between the sexes and in general. As we shall see in Part IIA
below, a commitment to the same ideals motivates the ethos of
nondirectiveness.
II. Nondirectiveness
"There is perhaps no area of medicine with a stronger commitment to
patient autonomy than reproductive genetics." 3 This commitment is expressed

28. See Warren, Gendercide at 21-22 (cited in note 14). The newer form of prenatal
testing, chorionic villus sampling, provides chromosome results and the ability to determine
sex within the first trimester, allowing women to terminate the pregnancy before the second trimester. Lori B. Andrews, et al, eds, Assessing Genetic Risks: Implications for Health
and Social Policy 76-77 (National Academy 1994). Women who terminate their pregnancies in the first trimester will not yet have felt fetal movement and will have carried the
fetus for a shorter time than those who abort in the second or third trimesters. Nevertheless, women who terminate their pregnancies during the first trimester may still experience
psychological stress and difficulty. See generally, Barbara Katz Rothman, The Tentative
Pregnancy: How Amniocentesis Changes the Experience of Motherhood (Norton 1993). See
also Irving G. Leon, When a Baby Dies: Psychotherapy for Pregnancy and Newborn Loss
63 (Yale 1990) (noting that guilt and depression may follow an abortion even if ultimately
outweighed by relief).
29. Wertz and Fletcher, Feminist Critique at 242 (cited in note 12); Wertz, Reproductive Technologies at 2214 (cited in note 11).
30. In China, where the policy of limiting family size to one child exacerbated the
urgency to have sons, the number of live male births for every 100 female births
eventually rose from 105 to 113.8 in 1990. Shripad Tuljapurkar, Nan Li, and Marcus W.
Feldman, High Sex Ratios in China's Future, 267 Sci 874, 874-75 (1995). In response to
the frightening population changes, the Chinese government has not only begun a campaign to alter sex preferences, Sheila Tefft, A Rush to Rob the Cradle-of Girls, Christian
Sci Monitor (Aug 2, 1995) (noting that the Chinese government has "launched a campaign
to change attitudes toward girl children and upgrade women's economic and social
status"), but has also instituted legal prohibitions against the practice of sex selection in
an attempt to reinstate the natural sex ratio. New Chinese Law Prohibits Sex-Screening of
Fetuses, NY Times A5 (Nov 15, 1994).
31. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Screening: Professional Standards and the Limits of
Prenatal Choice, 75 Obstet Gynecol 875 (1990).

1996]

Sex Selection, Nondirectiveness, and Equality 479

by the ethos of nondirectiveness, which holds that patients should make their
own decisions regarding genetic testing and reproductive options in terms of
their own values, beliefs, and circumstances, unhindered by the biases of
genetics professionals. While genetic counselors are trained to educate
counselees about the medical facts of genetic conditions, patterns of inheritance, and available options, and to help clients deal with the emotional repercussions, counselors are admonished not to make specific recommendations.32 They must not express their opinions as to what counselees should or
should not do. They can help patients clarify their values and relevant feelings,
but counselors should never prescribe a "right" set of values. 3
Nondirectiveness, as described in the literature, 4 requires genetic counselors to adopt a neutral posture to avoid directly influencing the counselees'
decisions." Consequently, counselors try to present the genetic data
nonjudgmentally and to support patients' decisions, whether or not the
criticism of a client's decicounselor agrees with them. 6 Most would regard
37
nondirectiveness.
of
breach
serious
a
sion as
Nondirectiveness at its extreme can be illustrated by the commonly cited
rule: a genetic counselor should never tell the counselee what she would do if
she were in the counselee's shoes.3 ' Nor should she tell counselees what
32. See, for example, Lynn Godmilow and Kurt Hirschhorn, Evaluation of Genetic
Counseling, in Herbert A. Lubs and Felix de la Cruz, eds, Genetic Counseling: A
Monograph of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development 121, 123
(Raven 1977) (referring to Mount Sinai's policy of nondirectiveness). See also Eleanor
Gordon Applebaum and Stephen K. Firestein, A Genetic Counseling Casebook 7 (Free
Press 1983) (asserting that it is proper that "the counselor does not seek to superimpose
his own objective upon that of the counselees").
33. Seymour Kessler, The Psychological Paradigm Shift in Genetic Counseling, 27 Soc
Biology 167, 175-77 (1980).
34. I should note that nondirectiveness, as described in the literature, may well
oversimplify how counselors understand the process and it may ignore the very real
possibility that genetic counselors do not share a uniform understanding of
nondirectiveness. Indeed, no good empirical data exist regarding what nondirectiveness really means to genetic counselors. Moreover, the traditional account of nondirectiveness tends
to describe a process that is potentially incoherent or inconsistent in some respects. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to explore those problems, though I address then in
another paper. See Sonia M. Suter, A Fresh Look at Nondirectiveness (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
35. The notion that any counseling posture can be meaningfully neutral has been challenged by many. See, for example, Karen Grandstrand Gervais, Objectivity, Value Neutrality, and Nondirectiveness in Genetic Counseling, in Dianne M. Bartels, Bonnie S.
LeRoy, and Arthur L. Caplan, eds, PrescribingOur Future: Ethical Challenges in Genetic
Counseling 119 (Aldine de Gruyter 1993).
36. Jessica G. Davis, A Counselor's Viewpoint, in Alexander M. Capron, et al, eds,
Genetic Counseling: Facts, Values, and Norms 113, 116-17 (Liss 1979).
37. Arthur L. Caplan, Neutrality Is Not Morality: The Ethics of Genetic Counseling,
in Dianne M. Bartels, Bonnie S. LeRoy, and Arthur L. Caplan, eds, Prescribing Our
Future: Ethical Challenges in Genetic Counseling 149, 152 (Aldine de Gruyter 1993).
38. Responding to a counselee's questions about what the genetic counselor would do,
counselors will offer such statements as: "It really wouldn't be helpful for me to answer
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others have decided when faced with similar situations. What others would do
is considered irrelevant since many counselors believe that no two couples are
alike in their values, goals, and upbringing.39
In short, the genetic counseling literature admonishes genetic counselors to
try to hide their biases and attitudes from patients, keeping them as mysterious
and unknowable as the secret of the Sphinx.
A. NONDIRECTIVENESS' COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY

Nondirectiveness reflects a commitment to equality in a number of ways,
both as it relates to counselees and counselors.' As Mahowald points out, its
focus on patient autonomy is consistent with a liberal feminist philosophy41 that
strives to achieve equal rights for women. Viewed in terms of liberal feminism,
nondirectiveness honors the individual rights of the woman (often in conjunction
with her partner)42 to make her own reproductive decisions unimpeded by the
genetic counselor. Nondirectiveness can be seen as an extension of the principles
underlying women's battle for reproductive freedom and the opportunity to terminate pregnancies without having to provide an "acceptable" justification.43

that question for you because I won't have to live with the consequences of the decision.
I believe I can be of assistance by helping you to discuss your feelings, to consider all
options, and to understand the facts upon which your decision should be based."
Applebaum and Firestein, Counseling Casebook at 210 (cited in note 32). But see F.C.
Fraser, Genetic Counseling, 26 Am J Hum Genetics 636, 649 (1974) ("Many counselors
would go so far as to say that although it is impossible to extrapolate himself entirely
into the counselee's situation . . . he thinks he would probably take a certain course of
action.").
39. Charles L. Bosk, All God's Mistakes: Genetic Counseling in a Pediatric Hospital
118 n 5 (Chicago 1992). See also Applebaum and Firestein, Counseling Casebook at 11
(cited in note 32) ("[N]o outsider can ever duplicate the counselees' experience of life
within the circle of their own family.").
40. Of course, the motivations driving nondirectiveness are likely varied and complex.
As a result, other factors in addition to a concern for equality may be at work. See Suter,
A Fresh Look (cited in note 34).
41. Mary B. Mahowald, Genetic Technologies and Their Implications for Women, 3
U Chi L Sch Roundtable 439, 459 (1996).
42. I do not want to ignore the importance of many male partners in the process of
genetic counseling. While many, even most, couples approach the complex decisions presented by genetic technology jointly, it remains true that, legally, the woman has the final
word about whether to undergo prenatal testing or pregnancy termination. Thus, to the
extent that genetic counseling is intimately connected to reproductive choices, genetic
counselors recognize the woman's special biological role. Even so, genetic counselors
always encourage women to consult their partners, if available. Women are seen as the
sole decision-makers in the "default" situations when partners are unavailable, uninvolved,
abusive, or when women patently refuse to include their partners for their own reasons.
43. The first master's-level genetic counseling program was established in the midst of
the emergence of the women's movement and the Supreme Court's growing recognition
that the right to privacy extends to procreative rights. See, for example, Griswold v
Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965) (finding a privacy right of married couples to use
contraceptives); Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438 (1972) (finding a privacy right of single
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As Mahowald indicates, women's potential to become pregnant is a sex-based
difference" (which can be viewed both positively and negatively). Consequently,
an ethic that supports the right of a woman to make reproductive decisions is
one that attempts to minimize the unequal burdens that pregnancy can impose,
thereby fostering sex equality. Thus, even if a woman chooses to use prenatal
testing to select for male fetuses-and nondirectiveness, as articulated in the
literature, insists that she be allowed this choice-nondirectiveness nonetheless
protects the equality and reproductive freedom of all women, even at the expense
of individual decisions that foster inequality.45
Ruth Cowan, a historian of science and technology, indirectly offers another
way in which nondirectiveness with regard to sex selection reflects a commitment
to feminism and equality. She defends sex selection in terms of a feminist ethic
based in nurturance. Both Gilligan and Rothman, Cowan notes, have identified
a "nurturing voice" in studies of couples who decided to terminate pregnancies.46 These couples "used the language of relationships, the need to sustain
relationships, the need to provide good relationships, the need to47 nurture and to
nurture well, in expressing their reasons for deciding to abort."
Scholars have extrapolated from this voice an ethical principle that contemplates the importance of nurturance in helping individuals become independent
and capable beings. Deciding whether to continue a pregnancy in terms of the
nurturance ethic, the couple or woman must consider the chances that the fetus
will be able to become independent and autonomous and whether the resources
necessary to nurture that fetus to independence will deprive others of
nurturance.45 Such an ethic, Cowan concludes, demands that decisions regarding abortion "should rest entirely in the hands of the woman who is pregnant, " 45 since she can best determine her capacity to nurture the fetus and others. Under this view, if a woman feels unable to nurture a daughter properly,
then it is better for this woman to avoid having a daughter. Therefore, physicians
should provide sex-selective abortion services to patients "no matter how
personally repugnant to the provider the decision of the woman may be.!'
To the extent that the underlying goals of nondirectiveness reflect this
feminist-based nurturance ethic, nondirectiveness toward sex selection is ulti-

people to use contraceptives); Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) (finding a Constitutional
right to abortion grounded in the right to privacy). As a result, many genetic counselors
became strong advocates of the counselees' "right to choose and decide about [their]
reproductive destiny." Kessler, 27 Soc Biology at 169 (cited in note 33).
44. Mahowald, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 442 (cited in note 41).
45. My discussion does not consider the instances in which women are coerced by
their families or husbands to undergo sex selection. In those instances, a woman is not
exercising reproductive freedom, therefore genetic counselors would undoubtedly feel quite
comfortable trying to protect the pregnant woman's autonomy vis-a-vis the coercive actors.
46. Cowan, Ethics for Autonomy at 256 (cited in note 9).
47. Id.
48. Id at 257-58.
49. Id at 258.
50. Id at 259.
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mately consistent with the principle of equality in two ways. It allows women or
couples to make choices that maximize the care and opportunities of others with
whom they have relationships. Such care accords respect to those others, recognizes them as important, and gives weight to their needs in considering important
family decisions-all of which is important to equality. In addition, it allows the
woman to consider how she can best be nurtured herself. In cultures that devalue
women, studies have shown that women who bear daughters receive less support
from family and friends and take less care of themselves than women who have
5s
sons.
Nondirectiveness also reflects feminist ideals and a concern for equality as it
relates to the role of the genetic counselor. While Mahowald correctly states that
"women who do genetic counseling do not neatly fit into either of Gilligan's
[justice and care] models of moral reasoning," she observes that they "evidence
elements of both justice and care." 5 2 Genetic counseling exemplifies Gilligan's
feminist care model of moral reasoning in notable ways. The psychological
paradigms underlying genetic counseling emphasize the counselor's responsibility
to be supportive and open to cultural and individual differences.5 ' This approach to counseling exhibits such caring elements as empathy and sensitivity
toward others. In addition, genetic counselors attempt to "know[] the other as
different from the self"54 and "to attend to voices other than their own and to
include in their judgment other points of view." 5 If one views nondirectiveness
in light of the "caring" voice of morality that Gilligan describes, it is not surprising that male geneticists are two to seven times more likely to be directive than
female geneticists.5 6
Mahowald points out that this openness to different perspectives supports
equality in that it empowers women by maximizing their autonomy 7 and
eroding the power imbalances that engender sexual inequality. It also empowers
other groups that typically have lacked power. It empowers anyone who is not
represented by the status quo because it supports perspectives that those "in
power" may reject or ignore. It empowers patients vis-A-vis the medical establish-

51. See Rick Weiss, Anti-Girl Bias Rises in Asia, Studies Show, Wash Post Al (May

11, 1996).
52. Mahowald, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 458-59, 460 (cited in note 41).
53. The first master's-level counseling programs incorporated psychology courses to
stress the emotional and psychological effects of genetic testing. See Joan H. Marks, The

Training of Genetic Counselors: Origins of a Psychosocial Model, in Dianne M. Bartels,
Bonnie S. LeRoy, and Arthur L. Caplan, eds, Prescribing Our Future: Ethical Challenges
in Genetic Counseling 15, 18-22 (Aldine de Gruyter 1993). This method of training
encouraged counselors to be nonjudgmental and not to assume that patients' values would
resemble their own or that the counselors' values were superior.

54. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development 11 (Harvard 1993).
55. Id at 16.
56. Dorothy C. Wertz and John C. Fletcher, Attitudes of Genetic Counselors: A
Multinational Survey, 42 Am J Hum Genetics 592, 597 (1988).
57. Mahowald, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 460 (cited in note 41).
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ment, minorities vis-a-vis the majority's perspective, and even genetic counselors
themselves vis-a-vis medical geneticists." All of these groups are empowered not
only because they are given a voice and are heard, but because they can carry
out their choices with the full support of genetic counselors and without judgment or criticism. Such efforts to empower the disenfranchised or those with
weak voices reflect an ideology consistent with not only feminist thought, but
also with critical theory in general. The ethos of nondirectiveness thereby works
toward 9leveling power imbalances and increasing equality among different
5
groups.
For all of these reasons, nondirectiveness can be seen as consistent with and
supportive of an interest in promoting equality between the sexes and among
other unequally treated groups. While justified on those grounds, application of
nondirectiveness to requests for sex selection continues to trouble many. Even
grounded in a concern for equality, nondirectiveness, at least in the case of sex
selection, quite often results in ethically problematic consequences for women.
With regard to sex selection, a concern for equality appears to lead down
divergent and conflicting paths, the possible resolution of which I will discuss in
Part IRI. First, let me take a moment, however, to explore how this quandary
affects medical professionals.
B. MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS' VIEWS TOWARD SEX SELECTION
Based on my earlier discussion of the equality-based arguments against sex
selection in Part I, it should come as no surprise that most medical professionals
oppose most uses of post-implantation sex selection on moral, medical, and
economic grounds."0 One study indicates that 85 to 99 percent of geneticists
and obstetricians disapprove of sex selection via prenatal diagnosis."1 Another
study, which examined the attitudes of health care professionals (79 percent of

58. Genetic associates, who tend to be well-educated and bright women, have had to
work hard to make a place for themselves in the hierarchical medical world. Genetic
associates often have had to vie for professional "turf," particularly when physicians
appear to curtail their opportunity to do the counseling for which they have been trained.
See Bosk, All God's Mistakes at 24 (cited in note 39) (describing a genetic associate's
frustration with her limited opportunities to provide genetic counseling). As a result, many
genetic associates ally with patients in a battle to overcome any attempts by physicians to
control medical decision-making. Of course many physician genetic counselors also strongly
believe in nondirectiveness. Nevertheless, studies indicate, see Pencarinha, et al, 1 J Genetic
Counseling at 28-29 (cited in note 6), and my experience as a genetic counselor confirms,
that the concern with protecting patient autonomy is greatest among genetic associates.
59. This argument, however, does not resolve the problem that nondirectiveness can
further empower those already empowered to the extent that it allows sexism or other
attitudes that enhance power imbalances to continue. Herein lies the tension for those who
see nondirectiveness as a tool to giving voice to the weak in general, because it may not
do so in all instances, such as when applied to sex selection.
60. John C. Fletcher, Is Sex Selection Ethical?, in Kre Berg and Knut E. Tranoy, eds,
Research Ethics 333 (Liss 1983).
61. Wertz and Fletcher, 37 Soc Sci Med at 1362 (cited in note 21).
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respondents) as well as ethicists and clergy (21 percent of respondents), found
that a majority of the respondents believed that sex selective pregnancy terminations in the first (67.2 percent), second (74.6 percent), and third (92.5 percent)
trimesters are morally unacceptable.62
Despite its moral aversion to sex-selective abortions, the medical profession
has become increasingly willing to perform prenatal diagnosis for sex selection
63
or to refer patients to others who would be willing to offer such testing.
Interestingly, as Mahowald notes, female Ph.D. and M.D. geneticists are more
likely than men to respond to requests for sex selection nondirectively.'
The few articles that have explored the attitudes of the predominately female
master's-level genetic counselors suggest that these counselors are also more
nondirective regarding sex-selection decisions than M.D. or Ph.D. geneticists. A
1989 study determined that 82 percent of such counselors in the United States
would grant requests for prenatal testing for sex selection (38.3 percent) or refer
patients to centers offering such a service (43.4 percent).6s
A more recent study of genetic counselors, primarily master's-level genetic
associates," offers no hard statistics but provides an impressionistic glimpse of
their attitudes toward sex selection. The authors conclude that these genetic
counselors shared "common views on only two issues: the ideal of nondirective

62. Evans, et al, 164 Am J Obstet Gynecol at 1094 (cited in note 11). The authors
of this study, a group of physicians and an ethicist, conclude that abortion for gender
selection "violates equality in a radical way. Also, gender is not a disease, and to abort
for gender is a precedent for eugenics." Id at 1098.
63. In 1972-73, 1% of American physicians fell into that category. In 1975, 15%
would recommend amniocentesis for sex selection in general and 28% would recommend
it for a couple with a daughter who wanted only two children and who wanted to ensure
that their second child would be a son. Burke, 34 Soc Sci Med at 1264 (cited in note 7).
By 1985, 62% would either perform such a procedure (34%) or would offer a referral
(28%) for a couple with four daughters who would abort unless the fifth fetus were male.
Wertz, Reproductive Technologies at 2213 (cited in note 11).
64. Mahowald, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 458-59 (cited in note 41). See also
Wertz and Fletcher, 37 Soc Sci Med at 1364 (cited in note 21). I want to make clear,
however, that geneticists have different attitudes and values and do not all share identical
approaches or attitudes toward sex selection. My arguments are based on what appear to
be, according to a limited number of studies, the most prevalent attitudes of genetic
professionals.
65. Pencarinha, et al, 1 J Genetic Counseling at 23-24 (cited in note 6). The authors
note, however, that most M.S. genetic counselors "would not grant the couple's request"
for a sex-selective abortion. Id at 24. This statement masks the fact that a substantial
percentage (43.4%) would refer such couples to other centers that presumably offer such
services. I make this presumption because the authors state, id at 21, that they modeled
the scenarios they presented to the genetic counselors after the Wertz, Fletcher, and
Mulvihill surveys, which describe referring patients to other centers "offering the service."
See Wertz, Fletcher and Mulvihill, 46 Am J Hum Genetics at 1206, table I (cited in note
5).
66. Burke, 34 Soc Sci Med at 1264 (cited in note 7). One of the respondents had a
medical degree and the 29 others, save four with B.A. degrees and on the job training,
had M.S. degrees. All but two of the counselors were female. Id at 1264-65.
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counseling... and a condemnation of the use of prenatal diagnosis for sex
selection purposes."' 7 Most genetic counselors "did not consider this practice
'business as usual,'"" and they were outraged that "scarce medical resources"
were being used for what they regarded as "a frivolous reason at best [and] a
morally shoddy abuse of reproductive freedom at worst."69 This study points
out, if only briefly, the dilemma at the center of this paper-the fact that sex
selection challenges many of the genetic counselors' moral commitments, including their commitments to the pro-choice ethic,7 to nondirectiveness,71 to cultural sensitivity, and to equality between the sexes.7 3 For modem-trained
genetic counselors, sex selection creates "cognitive dissonance" on several
fronts.74
III. Resolving the Incongruity Created by Sex Selection and
Nondirectiveness
What is to be done about the dissonance created by genetic counselors'
equality-based opposition to sex selection and commitment to nondirectiveness?
Is this dilemma resolvable or must genetic counselors choose one path at the
expense of the other? In other words, must their commitment to equality be expressed through adherence to nondirectiveness such that they grant requests for
sex selection without expressing their disapproval? Or must genetic counselors
disavow their commitment to nondirectiveness, at least with respect to sex
selection, in the interest of promoting equality?
Without attempting to offer any final answers to these questions, I propose
four possibly fruitful ways of addressing this problem. The first questions
whether a commitment to equality does in fact require a rejection of sex selection. The second examines whether a concefn for equality necessitates the sort of
nondirective approach described in the literature. A third response asserts that
nondirectiveness is a procedure designed to achieve important goals in general
and therefore it justifies certain isolated troubling outcomes. The final approach
concedes that ultimately this dilemma is intractable and therefore we should
come to terms with it, recognizing that genetic counselors cannot be expected to
achieve everything, including the promotion of equality in all instances.

67. Id at 1265.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id at 1266.
72. Id.
73. Id. Burke concluded that some of the counselors' comments suggested that they
"might not find sex-selective abortion quite so offensive if it were balanced between the
sexes or if it were carried out by people with similar cultural views to their own." Id.
This conclusion, if correct, suggests that the largest difficulty they have with sex selection
is its tendency to be used as a tool for discrimination against females.
74. Id at 1268.
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A. EQUALITY AND SEX SELECTION

The first potential response to the genetic counselor's dilemma is to challenge
the assertion that sex selection is inherently incompatible with equality. Perhaps
equality may be best preserved by allowing women or couples to make any
decision, however disconcerting, including the decision to have a sex-selective
abortion. After all, abortion is legal until viability, regardless of the reasons for
pregnancy termination. We permit abortion for essentially any reason, including
social concerns, economics, or convenience. To many, these reasons are no more
morally palatable than sex selection.7' Yet, feminists frequently defend abortion
decisions because women's ability to control their reproduction is central to their
equality. Why then, one might ask, would equality be furthered by singling out
certain reproductive decisions as immoral?
Moreover, one might argue, the real villains in the struggle against inequality
are the cultural values that demean women, as opposed to sex selection itself
which is only a symptom of such values. While sex selection may reflect demeaning attitudes toward women, attempting to prevent sex selection may actually do
little to promote equality. Instead, the real solution might be to address the
underlying roots of sexism and discrimination. Until those prejudices are eradicated, the presence or absence of sex selection will be of little consequence in
raising women's status. Thus, since nondirectiveness, by comparison, at least has
the potential to promote equality by enhancing women's reproductive autonomy,
a nondirective approach to sex selection requests may be most compatible with
equality.
76
B. NONDIRECTIVENESS-"IMPERFECT PROCEDURAL JUSTICE"

An alternative approach would be to defend nondirectiveness on the grounds
that it is a procedure that both inherently and instrumentally promotes equality.
As discussed in Part II, nondirectiveness has inherent value by virtue of its
underlying commitment to equality and autonomy. By giving counselees autonomy in genetic decisionmaking, the process expresses a deep respect for individuals and enhances equality among individuals. Our legal system is similarly
defended on the basis that it is rooted in a deep concern for justice and fair
representation. For example, by guaranteeing all criminal defendants a constitutional right to a fair trial and legal representation, our legal system treats
individuals with respect and promotes equality.

75. Fletcher, Ethics and Public Policy at 229 (cited in note 10).
76. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 85 (Belknap 1971). Rawls identifies two different
systems of justice. A system of pure procedural justice must have "an independent
standard for deciding which outcome is just and a procedure guaranteed to lead to it."
Id at 84-85 (emphasis added). Procedural justice under such a system is perfect because
justice would always be guaranteed. However, more realistic and practical systems of
justice only achieve imperfect procedural justice because they do not always lead to the
correct result. But, like the criminal trial, they are systems of justice nonetheless because
they are designed to reach just results most of the time. Id at 85-86.
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One could argue further that nondirectiveness not only has inherent but also
significant instrumental value with regard to equality. According to this view,
nondirectiveness provides a coherent approach to genetic counseling that promotes equality more often than any other approach. The nondirective procedure
for genetic counseling is more effective at protecting equality and autonomy in
troubling reproductive decisions than ad hoc responses. In other words,
nondirectiveness is part of a system that ensures that patients make voluntary
reproductive decisions in accord with their values. In most cases, the results will
be morally satisfactory to geneticists who strive, above all, to help families reach
decisions in harmony with the lives they hope to create for themselves. Moreover, this approach treats all clients equally by giving equal weight and respect
to their individual perspectives and choices. Thus, although nondirectiveness may
require genetic counselors to support certain positions that appear inconsistent
with equality, they can be comforted by knowing that the process most often
preserves equality and respect.
Again, our system of legal advocacy provides a nice analogy. Lawyers often
face the dilemma of defending a client whose position conflicts with the attorneys' moral views. Many a public defender has had to represent vigorously and
with conviction defendants whom the attorney strongly suspects have committed
serious crimes, such as rape or murder. Similarly, corporate attorneys are often
morally troubled by representing particular sides of a dispute or even particular
clients. Yet these attorneys resolve their moral discomfort with particular clients
or legal positions by recognizing the valuable role they play in a system more farreaching than the individually troubling cases. They can defend their actions by
reasoning that a legal system that provides full and effective advocacy for both
sides is best able to reach the most legally just result, even though the system
may fail in certain instances.' Procedure is valued over substantive judgments
in specific instances because it ensures the most satisfactory approach for the
system as a whole, even if it is sometimes imperfect.
According to this line of reasoning, the dilemma for genetic counselors
would dissolve if genetic counselors viewed nondirectiveness as part of a system
(albeit imperfect) intended to respect and treat individuals equally. Therefore,
counselors could justify a nondirective approach to sex selection as the approach
most consistent with a general, systematic commitment to equality even though
equality may be compromised in particular cases.
C. THE LIMITATIONS OF NONDIRECTIVENESS

One might respond to the dilemma in quite a different manner. One could
argue that, in spite of the moral justifications underlying nondirectiveness, its
ethic is effectively more procedural than substantive. As a consequence,
nondirectiveness runs the risk, as in the case .of sex selection, of producing

77. Id at 85-86 (describing criminal trials as an example of imperfect procedural justice-"[a]n innocent man may be found guilty, a guilty man may be set free").
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ethically problematic results. Perhaps if we really care about equality, the
argument would continue, we should not condone a nondirective approach to
genetic counseling because it, at least in some cases, perpetuates inequality and
other values to which we are morally opposed. Moreover, though
nondirectiveness can give voice to the disempowered in general, in certain
instances, such as when families request sex selection because they devalue
females, nondirectiveness serves to further empower the empowered and
disempower the disempowered.
The solution under this view would be to search for alternative approaches
to counseling. Genetic counselors who refuse to be nondirective with regard to
sex selection might still protect patient autonomy, empower the weak, express
compassion and sensitivity toward "other voices," and promote equality. Genetic
counselors might be able to achieve the goals underlying nondirectiveness
without being nondirective."
One such approach might include refusing to offer or refer patients to other
clinics for sex selection testing or refusing to provide information about the sex
of the fetus until the pregnancy is so far advanced that abortion becomes
infeasible or illegal." Such outright refusals, however, do little to honor the
underlying goals of nondirectiveness, including a concern for equality and
autonomy.
Instead, genetic counselors could develop a more nuanced approach to
counseling that is consistent with the rationales underlying nondirectiveness. In
difficult cases, such as sex selection, where nondirectiveness would likely produce
ethically troubling results, an alternative approach might allow genetic counselors
to be true to their equality values. Between the extremes of prohibiting sex
selection and failing to express one's views lie other possibilities. For example,
counselors might lift their veils of neutrality and engage in a moral discussion
with clients in which they articulate their deep concerns regarding sex selection. o Developing such an alternative approach, however, would require serious
rethinking of the appropriate role of genetic counseling.
D. ROLE LIMITATION
Finally, one could simply accept the genetic counselors' quandary as unavoidable rather than attempt to "dissolve" the problem by reconceptualizing it.

78. That is, nondirective in the way that the literature so often describes it.
79. See Wertz and Fletcher, Feminist Critique at 248 (cited in note 12); Marc Lapp6,
Choosing the Sex of Our Children, Hastings Ctr Rep 1, 2 (Feb 1974); Burke, 34 Soc Sci
Med at 1267 (cited in note 7) (noting that in Canada, the policy is to wait until the
seventh month of gestation, when abortions are not legal, to release information on feral
sex); Wertz and Fletcher, 37 Soc Sci at 1365 (cited in note 21) (suggesting that laboratories should not release the information of fetal sex to the physician).
80. See Robert Wachbroit and David Wasserman, Patient Autonomy and Value-Neutrality in Nondirective Genetic Counseling, 6 Stan L & Pol'y Rev 103, 109 (1995) (noting

the value in an approach between "outright refusal and silent acquiescence"). See also
Suter, A Fresh Look (cited in note 34).
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Perhaps we expect too much from genetic counseling. Any professional can only
do so much in the name of equality or any other moral value. Thus, genetic
counselors might defend a nondirective approach to sex selection on the basis
that their role in patient care, by necessity, must have certain limitations. The
primary goal of genetic counseling is to educate patients regarding their options
and to help patients reach decisions with which they will be able to live in the
future, not to ameliorate societal inequality.
Even if committed to principles of equality, genetic counselors cannot expect
to abandon the defining elements of their job to fight for equality in all instances. Like the roles of physicians, lawyers, and therapists, the role of genetic
counselors must be circumscribed to some extent, otherwise the burdens and
responsibilities of their positions will become unwieldy. Genetic counselors
simply cannot be held accountable for fighting against all inequities in the world.
Perhaps all we can expect is that the underlying rationales supporting nondirectiveness are morally sound and that genetic counselors fulfill the goals of
their profession, rather than struggle against every injustice they encounter.
IV. Conclusion
The genetics community has long recognized the dissonance that genetic
counselors experience when faced with requests for sex selection. Yet, little has
been done to explore the conceptual underpinnings of this conflict so that we
might begin to dissolve the problem or lessen the tensions it creates. While a
commitment to equality arguably creates such dissonance by both motivating a
nondirective approach and by making sex selection morally offensive, it may be
possible to rethink the consequences of a commitment to equality such that the
conflict is resolvable. In a modest first step, this Article attempts to map possible
avenues for further inquiry and invites others to help explore solutions to this
problem.

